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I begin with a personal note. Last October I was a member of a delegation of philosophers
that visited philosophy departments in nine universities in China. Since I was writing a book on
logic, my main interest was the status of logic in Chinese philosophy. Prior to going, I had read
a book by Chinese professor Ming-Jer Chen at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School
entitled “Inside Chinese Business”. In that book I was surprised to find the following statement:
“Chinese does not have grammatical structures equivalent to the English conditional mode:
that is, statements that encourage the listener to put aside direct reality and enter into an
imaginary realm of hypothetical (“If you had arrived in time for the meeting, we would have
made a deal”). This grammatical difference between Chinese and English has important
cognitive and communicative implications; namely the Chinese show a remarkable resistance to
hypothetical thinking.”
Since the conditional, in my opinion, is the connective that is most indispensable in logic, I
was intrigued. So at the first university I visited, East China Normal University in Shanghai, I
asked whether the Chinese language had a conditional sign. Their professor of logic, Dr. Jui
Rong Dong, assured me that it did and produced two Chinese characters, one for ‘if’ and one for
‘then’. However, he also recommended the book by Christoph Harbsmeier, entitled Logic and
Language on Ancient China, Volume 7 of a Cambridge University Series on Technology and
Civilization of China which Ms. Garrett just spoke about. I had never heard of this book before,
so I duly noted it down in my notebook. When I got back to this country, Hans Hansen asked
me, out of the blue, if I would like to comment on Ms. Carrett’s paper on a book by Harbsmeier.
I checked on the book with Barnes and Noble, who informed me it was 476,000th on the
Bestseller List and it costs $130. Nevertheless I ordered it and after looking at it, accepted Hans’
invitation.
Garrett’s paper mentions a two-part proposition that is of great interest to philosophers and
historians of science, and hovers ever in the background of this book. I will focus on this. The
two claims, offered to explain why modern science did not develop in China as it did the West,
are that
1) “a certain kind of reasoning is necessary for the evolution of science, and
2) that something about the Chinese language mitigates against this kind of
reasoning.”
As Garrett says, Harbsmeier agrees with first part of this proposition—that a certain kind of
reasoning is necessary for the development of science, and in particular that logic is crucial for
the evolution of scientific thought. As she also says, Harbsmeier never really clarifies what that
exact relationship is. Unfortunately this is true; in fact Harbsmeier does not display much
competence in either logic or the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, I strongly agree with
Harbsmeier; there is such a relation.
Garrett goes on to say that Harbsmeier “disagrees with the notion that the Chinese did not or
could not think logically.” That is true and again I agree with Harbsmeier, but I begin to part
company with the second part of the next sentence, which reads,
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“Building on the accumulated research of Chinese scholars, which he augments through
his analyses and examples, Harbsmeier explores and definitively disproves the
misconceptions that these claims are based on.”

This seems to suggest that Harbsmeier has definitively disproved the second proposition, namely
that “something about the Chinese language mitigates against” the kind of reasoning necessary
for the evolution of science—or at least that he has disproved the propositions that have been
offered to support this conclusion. These propositions are fairly widely held and Garrett lists
them as,
1) that the writing system is pictographic, thus discouraging abstract thought
2) that the language has no grammar.thus inhibiting analytic thinking;
3) that the language lacks counterfactuals, thereby hindering speculative thought;
4) that the Chinese have no conception of Truth, the sentence, or class relations,
making logical reasoning impossible
5) that the Chinese reason analogically, rather than deductively or hypotheticdeductively,
6) the Chinese think poetically, holistically, and organically rather than analytically
and logically.
Although Harbsmeier shows that the statements above require considerable alteration and
refinement, I think he is a very long way from definitively disproving these statements or the
conclusion they purport to support.
Now I am a logician rather than a linguist, and I have had no training in the Chinese
language so I have to rely on Harbsmeier and other experts for analyses of Chinese texts. But I
believe, as do some of the other experts, that the second part of the proposition above is true—
there are features of the Chinese language which mitigate against the development of the kind
logic that was developed in the Greek language by Aristotle and the Stoics and has evolved into
modern logic, and that this fact goes a considerable way to explaining why modern science did
not develop in China as it did in the West. Further, I believe that Harbsmeier’s examples and
many of his conclusions support this.
The first 17 books in the seven volumes to which this book belongs, were guided by a sort of
friendly bias. Its editor, Joseph Needham wanted to “admit Asia to equality on our thoughts, not
only politically but culturally” (a quote from B. Russell placed on the Frontespiece of Volume
II). In Volume I, page 18, Needham wrote “It is my conviction that the Chinese proved
themselves able to speculate about nature at least as well as the Greeks in their earlier period. If
China produced no Aristotle, it was, I would suggest, because the inhibitory factors which
prevented the rise of modern science and technology there began to operate already before the
time at which Aristotle could have been produced.”
Harbsmeier seems to share this attitude. He seems to be want to avoid invidious
comparisons. Having asked the question, “Why did the practice of of yin ming [Chinese Buddhist
logic] decline whereas Aristotelian logic was revived and developed into a central discipline
within the European educational system?” he says “These are questions that belong properly to
the anthropology of logic” (p. 414). I don’t believe these questions belong to anthropology; I
believe they can be answered by examining and comparing logic in the West, with writings in
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China. Harbsmeier concludes “...the structure and nature of the Chinese language—for all the
constraints these impose on Chinese rhetoric—can not be the decisive factor, since the extant
logical yin ming texts [of Chinese Buddhist logic] are about as clear or as unclear as their
contemporary and comparable European counterparts within the field of Aristotelian logic” (p.
414). Whether or not Aristotle and Buddhist logic are equally clear I don’t know, since I do not
know Chinese. But their clarity is not the issue. The relevant question for the issue before us is
whether the logic of Chinese Buddhism, could help foster the development of modern theoretical
science as well as the logical principles of Aristotle, the Stoics and subsequent logicians could,
and whether the Chinese language contains the same features needed for the development of
logic as the Greek, Latin, and Indo-European languages do.
Western logic is based on two things: the use of variables for propositions, predicates, and
individual entitities, and a unique set of distinct ‘syncategorematic’ or “logical” words, namely,
‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if...then’ ‘not’, ‘all’ and ‘some’. These are the components of which valid schemata
are built.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) developed a system of logic with ‘all’, ‘some’ and ‘no’ as his
logical constants. Using them with Greek letters as variables for noun phrases he presented
schemata that would be valid, no matter what nouns or noun phrases were substituted for the
variables. By these means he conveyed universal principles of logical validity. He presented
these schemata in conditional statements using the Greek word, ‘εί’ or ‘ε̉άν ’ for ‘if ’, as in “if A
is predicated of none of B and B of all C, it follows that A will apply to no C” (Aristotle, Prior
Analytics, 26 (celarent)). In the following century (300-206 B.C.) the Stoics and Megarians
developed a system of logic using variable terms for sentences and the Greek words ‘If ...then’,
‘both...and’, ‘either... or’ and ‘not’ as sentence connectives. Euclid, who had studied in Athens,
wrote his Elements of Geometry while a university teacher in Alexandria around 300 BC.
Archimedes applied and extended Euclid’s work to physics. Their treatises in Greek used the
same language, with copious occurrences of “if... then…” and other logical constants. Many, if
not all, of their proofs were logically valid by criteria formulated in the schools of Aristotle and
the Stoics. Today modern logic is built up using similar variables and the same logical constants
translated into English or other Indo-european languages. The great scientists of the modern era
were schooled in these logics, and their disciplines were governed in part by these concepts of
logical validity.
As Harbsmeier and other scholars have noted, classical Chinese lacks several features which
were indispensable in formulating this logic.
1) Harbsmeier tells us that Buddhist logic in China, ‘Yin Ming’, has no variables. He says
“Aristotle’s formulations absolutely and quite invariably involve variables. Chinese Buddhist
formulations, as far as I have been able to ascertain, never involve any variables...” (p. 406).
Further, he says, “Buddhist logic in China suffers from this sort of limitation. It cannot
systematically and freely abstract from the concrete terms in its proposition and formulate the
formal laws governing valid inference. It invariably discusses concrete examples, and moreover
always examples that are of Buddhist logical significance” (p. 406). (Harbsmeier says the later
Mohists “used a term which came close to a ‘variable’” to formulate the distinction between
names which involve properties of things, and names that do not (p. 333). Also after asking,
“was Aristotle’s invention of variables repeated anywhere else?” he calls the Chinese mou for
“such-and-such” a “pseudo-variable”; different occurrences refer to different people or entities
(p 287).)
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Ancient Greeks and modern Europeans alike could use letters of their alphabet as variables
since letters have no meaning. Chinese has no alphabet; it has fixed characters replete with
meanings. Perhaps the lack of meaningless letters deprived China of simple devices to serve as
variables that can help convey schemata of sentences with the very abstract property of being
logically valid.
2) Harbsmeier discounts the view that all Chinese characters are pictographic. He agrees
that many Chinese characters began as pictures, but holds the currently prevailing view that in
most cases “Chinese characters stand for pronunciations of ... words in the spoken language, and
mean what they mean because the morphemes have the meanings that they have in the spoken
language” (p34). If spoken words can have abstract meanings so can some characters; and he
shows that some Chinese characters do stand for abstract entities. But in various places
Harbsmeier makes clear that they did not have certain kinds of abstract concepts that could be
conveyed by Greek suffixes or schemata.
3) It is not true that the Chinese language has no grammar. True, its characters cannot be
categorized as verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs etc., since the same character may serve as noun,
verb or adjective depending on its position in a sentence. The characters do not change by
person, mood, voice or gender, or have past, present and future forms. But there is a Chinese
grammar; according to Hu Shih (1970) it is so easy it did not need saying (cf. p. 86). However,
Harbsmeier concludes that the more complex “Classical Greek and Latin show a much greater
systematic ability unambiguously and transparently to articulate logical and grammatical
complexity than the comparable Classical or Literary Chinese.”, that this aids in developing
scientific theories, and that “...the traditional Chinese scientists would also appear to be at a clear
linguistic disadvantage.”
The first book on Chinese grammar was written in 1904. At the end of Chapter c) Logical
Features of the Classical Chinese Language (pp. 171-3), Harbsmeier “confidently concludes”,
“despite the possibility that he my be reflecting his cultural prejudices,” that
“Classical Chinese writers show a very considerably lesser tendency to use rhetorical
and semantic complexity (in the technical senses we have.indicated above) than
Classical Greek and Latin writers...
“To the extent that the habit of reliably decoding highly complex articulated meanings
constitutes a mental exercise that may be healthy for the conduct of science in sofar as
science involves very complex interrelationships between statements that need to be
made explicit, aspiring scientists who are learning Classical Chinese were at a certain
disadvantage when compared with speakers of Classical Greek or Latin.
“I conclude, secondly, that Classical Greek and Latin show a much greater systematic
ability unambiguously and transparently to articulate logical and grammatical complexity
than the comparable Classical or Literary Chinese.
“To the extent that the rhetorically or semantically very complex sentences which
cannot be reproduced in Classical or Literary Chinese should prove to be a significant aid
in explicating, questioning and developing an overall constellation of scientific theories,
the traditional Chinese scientist would also appear to be at a clear linguistic
disadvantage.”
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Garrett says Harbsmeier “asks whether Classical Chinese had the terms and structures
which would allow expression of the operations of symbolic logic, such as various kinds of
negation, implication, counterfactuals, inference, disjunction, conjunction, and quantifiers and
he answers with a resounding affirmative.” I don’t read Harbsmeier that way; he says Chinese
lacks some of these.
4) With respect to negation Harbsmeier says, “Aristotle developed an abstract notion of
negation, apophasis” (p. 107) but “In Classical Chinese literature we find no abstract notion of
negation as such” (p. 108), although he lists eleven different Chinese characters which each
convey what we in English might call specialized negations, e.g., a ‘not’ for times, a ‘not’ for
terms denoting objects, a ‘not’ for sentences.
5) He also says, “Classical Chinese has no current equivalent for the declarative vel ‘or’.
“The standard way to ask whether something is fish or fowl in Classical Chinese is to ask two
questions “Is it fish?” “Is it fowl?” (pp. 119-20). Again, “It is often noticed that Classical
Chinese does not have one word for ‘or’ that was used in declarative sentences like “Sages are
either arrogant or stupid...”. He adds, “It is a curiously easy task to construct logical/syntactic
constellations [involving several ‘if...then…’s and ‘or’s] that are easy to articulate in in a
language like Classical Latin, but apparently impossible to articulate in Classical Chinese” (p.
158).
6) Harbsmeier’s discussion of the conditional in Chinese leaves us somewhat confused.
Under the heading Inference, he informs us that “The conditional particle tse, ‘then’, which
can mark the relation between an antecedent and a consequent in conditionals, is among the most
frequent words of the Classical Chinese language” (p. 118). But it is not clear that ‘tse’ has the
same meaning as the Western conditional. The Harvard University Press’s Chinese-English
dictionary translates the character tse as both “and so” and “then”; if it is followed by some
characters it means ‘then, in consequence’, and by other characters it means, ‘that is the end of it,
so be it’, and it has many other meanings in other linguistics contexts. Sequences of passages
with just ‘tse’ in them, like ‘p tse q, q tse r , p tse r which are translated as “If p then q, if q then r
and if p then r’ may also be translated as ‘p and so q, q and so r, p and so r’ without conditionals.
On counterfactual conditionals, experts differ. Alfred Bloom (a linguist and psychologist,
now President of Swarthmore College) wrote in 1981, “... the Chinese language has no distinct
lexical, grammatical or intonational device to signal entry into the counterfactual realm, to
indicate explicitly that the events referred to have definitely not occurred and are being discussed
for the purpose of exploring the might-have-been or the might-be” (p. 118). Bloom’s book on
this subject cites interesting empirical evidence of contemporary difficulties that Chinese natives
have in understanding hypothetical reasoning. Ms. Garrett reviewed this book in 1985 and
Harbsmeier seems to agree with her counter-view, asserting that “explicit counterfactual
reasoning was frequent in ancient China. The lack of verb forms like the subjunctive in Chinese
did not lead to a lack of explicit counterfactuals.” On the other hand we have the statement of
Jer-Ming Chen about hypothetical thinking in China.
7) Harbsmeier’s attempts to show that ancient Chinese presented arguments with some of
the standard logical forms are appallingly unconvincing.
With respect to Modus Ponens, on pages 284-5 Harbsmeier give ‘p implies q, p, Ergo: q’ as
modus ponens, [confusing ‘implies’ with ‘if...then…’], then he gives an example which is not a
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clear case of Modus Ponens, summarises it in a form which is clearly not Modus Ponens, and
then says, “As our analysis shows, this is far from being a neat case of argument by modus
ponens, but the connection with modus ponens is clear enough.” The passage (translated by
D.C.Lau) is: “Pi Hsi summoned the Master, and the Master wanted to go. Tzu Lu said,
‘Sometime ago I heard it from you, Master, that the gentleman does not enter the domain of one
who in his person does what is not good. Now Pi Hsi is using Chung Mou as a stronghold to
stage a revolt. How can you justify going there?’” Harbsmeier’s summarizes the argument as: “1.
The gentleman should not enter the domain of a person who does what is not good. 2. Pi Hsi is
a person who does what is not good. 3. You, Confucius area gentleman. 4. Ergo: you,
Confucius, should not enter Pi Hsi’s domain.”
On page 390 he cites other passages which “seem to come close to using the modus ponens,”
but they have no clear relation to Modus Ponens either.
With respect to Modus Tollens, on pages 282-3 Harbsmeier says ModusTollens “turns out
to be much more popular in ancient China than its seemingly more straightforward counterpart,
the modus ponens”. He gives what he calls a typical Chinese of example of Modus Tollens. But
his example is not a clear example of Modus Tollens, and Harbsmeier’s attempt to formulate it
turns out to be, in his words, “in imperfect form of modus ponens”. He then ends up saying
“However, the argument is clearly a formally valid one. Given the premises the conclusion
follows logically.” There are no doubt better examples of his point. (Harbsmeier’s “typical
Chinese argument” (translated by Lau) reads “Jan Chhui said: ‘It is not that I am not pleased
with your way, but rather that my strength gives out.’ The Master replied: ‘A man whose
strength gives out, gives up mid-way. Now in your case you set the limits beforehand.’ ”
Under the heading ‘Sorites’, Harbsmeier gives several examples of what might better be
called chains of correlations. For example, Han Fei (3rd Cent BC) wrote a sequence beginning,
When a man has good fortune, wealth and honour come to him
When wealth and honour come to him he eats well and dresses well
When he eats and dresses well, arrogance will arise...

This sort of chain apparently occurs quite frequently in ancient Chinese philosophy. But the
interpretation as a sorites is questionable. Apparently Han Fei used ‘Tse’ for the assumed
conditional, for Harbsmeier wrote about this passage, that “There is no doubt that Han Fei here
focuses on the transitivity of the relation he denotes by the Chinese word tse. ... However, Han
Fei is not, in fact setting up a sequence of logical implications by using the particle tse. By using
p tse q, Han Fei only claims a regular concommitance between p and q in this world. He is not
concerned with the logical connection between p and q in any possible world” (p. 281).
The full sequence, as translated by C. D. Lau, 1984—with possible schematizations added
on the right—was (see page 281):
When a man has good fortune, wealth and honour come to him If P then Q P&Q,
When wealth and honour come to him he eats well and dresses well
When he eats and dresses well, arrogance will arise

If R then S

If Q then R Q&R

R&S
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When arrogance arises, his behavior will be wicked and his actions will be contrary to
principle If S then (T&U) S&(T&U)
When his behavior is wicked he will die an untimely death If T then W

T&W

When his actions are contrary to principle he will be unsuccessful If U then V U&V
On the one hand he will have the misfortune of an untimely death If W then M W&M
On the other hand he will be known as unsuccessful. That is misfortune. If V then M
V&M
Therefore, it is said Misfortune lurks in good fortune.

If P then M

P&M

The schematization as a sorites with conditionals may be reading a Western interpretation
into the Chinese text. It could be schematized as ‘P&Q, Q&R, R& (T&U),T&W, U&V, W&M,
V&M, P&M’.
8) In his Concluding Reflections Harbsmeier says “There is much to be learnt from the
Chinese about human language, but one thing I have not found in classical Chinese is any kind of
special Chinese logic” (p.410). Though the Chinese may sometimes have made what the West
could identify as a logically valid argument, they apparently never formulated the concept of a
logically valid argument as the Greeks did. In concluding his discussion of the best Chinese logic
Yin Ming (Chinese Buddhist logic of the 7th and 8th centuries), Harbsmeier compares it with
Aristotelian and later formal logics. He says, “Western logical theory is in principle indifferent to
the question of what concretely the premisses of an argument are, or whether the premisses of an
argument as a matter of fact are true or not. Aristotelian and later more general formal theories of
logic in the West are interested in premisses only in a conditional way: if the premisses were
true, would this logically imply that the conclusion also was true?” In contrast, “‘Yin Ming’ does
not systematically distinguish between factual truth and logical validity” (pp. 404-5). Indeed, he
reports, “to the Chinese Buddhist an argument which justifies a thesis which goes against the
teachings of one’s own school or against one’s own known views is logically unacceptable” (p.
376); the so-called “logical acceptability” here is not logical validity, and indeed is not logical at
all in the Western sense of logical.
Like the words ‘hydrogen’, ‘oxygen’, ‘atom’, ‘molecule’, ‘electron’ and ‘photon’, the term
‘logically valid’ was developed in the West. Without the concepts they stand for the modern
science would not have been possible. China did not have these concepts. I believe this even
more true for the concept of logical validity than for those of ‘hydrogen’ and ‘electron’.
In short, far from definitively disproving the thesis that classical Chinese lacked the features
necessary to develop a system of logic and the kind of thinking that was needed to for the
development of modern science, Harbsmeier’s book provides much support for this thesis.
By the 13th Century China did indeed accomplish great feats of engineering and had many
marvelous mechanical inventions, a civil service, and a rich philosophical heritage. It had
concepts of truth and falsehood and words identifying premisses and conclusions in arguments;
but its emphasis was on practice and social harmony. It is one thing to give evidence that the
Chinese could and did think logically. It is another to say their language could express the logical
concepts that have been crucial for the kind of scientific development that took place in the
West. They had no such logic, and it is not clear that they could have provided the universal
criteria of logically valid inferences that were capable of being expressed in the Indo-European
languages.

